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Bankruptcy | Case Law | Standing Mootness Ripeness

STANDING, MOOTNESS AND RIPENESS

In re Kronemyer, 405 B.R. 915 (9th Cir. BAP 2009)

Surety had standing to bring motion for relief from the automatic stay, even though it only

had a contingent claim for contribution or reimbursement under § 502(e)(1).

In re Coleman, 560 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2009)

Student loan undue hardship determinations are ripe for decision substantially in advance of

completion of a chapter 13 plan. Constitutional and prudential ripeness discussed as length.

In re Gould, 401 B.R. 415, 421 (9th Cir. BAP 2009)

Appeal was not moot, where even if the debtor had spent a tax refund that the IRS should

have been allowed to set off against, the court could still order the money returned.

In re PW LLC, 391 B.R. 25, 33-37 (9th Cir. BAP 2008)

Sale involving lien stripping under § 363(f)(5) was not subject to constitutional, equitable or

statutory mootness under § 363(m).

In re Nelson, 391 B.R. 437 (9th Cir. BAP 2008)

Dismissal of repeat filers’ third bankruptcy case did not moot appeal from earlier order

dismissing an adversary proceeding to recover for a mortgagee’s violation of the automatic stay.

Suter v. Goedert, 504 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2007)

Motion for stay pending appeal was not mooted by state supreme court’s dismissal of an

appeal in the underlying suit.

Vacation Village, Inc. v. Clark County, Nev, 497 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2007)

Landowners’ claims were ripe, because the government agency had made a final decision,

and the owners also met the exhaustion requirement.

In re Sherman, 491 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2007)

Entry of discharge in this chapter 7 case did not moot the appeal, because it did not

terminate the debtor’s bankruptcy, and the grant of the SEC’s motion to dismiss under § 707(a) may

have triggered a reconsideration of the discharge order.

In re Sobczak, 369 B.R. 512, 516 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)

Chapter 13 debtor had standing to seek dismissal under § 1307(c), since he had a pecuniary

interest and practical stake in whether his case was dismissed.

Estate of Spirtos v. San Bernardino County, 443 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006)

“. . .[A]s a creditor, plaintiff lacks standing to raise RICO claims on behalf of Basil’s

bankruptcy estate because only the bankruptcy trustee has standing to sue on behalf of the estate.”

In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005)

Bankruptcy court had “arising under” jurisdiction over state law tort suits removed removed

from state court, since such actions were totally preempted by § 303(i). Furthermore, siblings of

debtors had no standing to bring an action under § 303(i).

Smith v. Arthur Anderson LLP, 421 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005)

Plan trustee had standing to sue former officers and directors, since the trustee was seeking

to redress injuries to the debtor caused by the defendants’ conduct, rather than injury to creditors.

Here, the trustee asserted that the defendants concealed the debtor’s financial condition, and if they

hadn’t, the debtor might have filed for bankruptcy sooner and additional assets might not have been

expended on a failed business.

In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2005)

Where two potentially preclusive lower court judgments were involved, after appeal became

moot through no act of party seeking relief, vacatur was required as to both judgments of the

district court or BAP and the bankruptcy court.

In re Popp, 323 B.R. 260 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)

Equitable mootness did not apply to a sale order that was improperly entered under § 363.

Doctrine explained.

In re Gotcha International L.P., 311 B.R. 250 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2004)

Appeal of confirmation order dismissed for equitable mootness, where debtor had obtained

a refinance and distributed substantial payments to all but two classes.

In re La Sierra Financial Services, Inc., 290 B.R. 718 ( 9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002)

Nonparty purchasers of property sold by a bankruptcy estate have standing to appear and

seek relief from orders which may affect their property interests.

In re Chiu, 266 B.R. 743 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2001), aff’d, 304 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2002)

Debtors had both constitutional and prudential standing to seek lien avoidance after property

was sold.

In re Stoll, 252 B.R. 492 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2000)

Chapter 7 debtor with solvent estate lacked standing to sue professionals employed by

trustee.

In re P.R.T.C., Inc., 177 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1999)

Creditor has standing to challenge trustee’s transfer of avoiding actions.

In re Cross, 218 B.R. 76 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998)

Securities and Exchange Commission has standing as creditor to object to discharge

of disgorgement judgment against debtor

In re Abbott, 183 B.R. 198 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995)

Individual alleged to have received fraudulent transfer from bankruptcy debtor lacks

standing to appeal bankruptcy court order denying her motion to set aside order reopening debtor’s

case.

“Standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which is open to review at all stages of the

litigation.” National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 114 S.Ct. 798, 802

(1994). The test for standing is generally referred to as the “person aggrieved” test. Only entities

who are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order of the bankruptcy court have

standing to appeal. Matter of Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983). The entity must

demonstrate that the order diminished its property, increased its burdens or detrimentally affected

its rights.

In re Umpqua Shopping Center, Inc., 111 B.R. 303 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1990)

Debtor lacked standing to appeal for third party.

In re Brooks, 871 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1989)

Trustee of ex-wife’s bank had no standing as non-creditor to raise violation of automatic

stay in husband’s bankruptcy